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Comparing the Effectiveness of Regulation and Pro-Social Emotions to Enhance 
Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Fishing Communities in Colombia 
 
Abstract: This paper presents the results from a series of framed field experiments conducted in 
fishing communities off the Caribbean coast of Colombia. The goal is to investigate the relative 
effectiveness of exogenous regulatory pressure and pro-social emotions in promoting cooperative 
behavior in a public goods context. The random public revelation of an individual’s contribution 
and its consequences for the rest of the group leads to significantly higher public good 
contributions and social welfare than regulatory pressure, even under regulations that are 
designed to motivate fully efficient contributions.  
 
JEL Codes: C93, H41, Q20, Q28 
Keywords:  public goods, field experiments, pro-social emotions, social dilemma, regulation, 
enforcement. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents the results from a series of framed field experiments that were conducted in 
two fishing communities on two islands along the Caribbean coast of Colombia. The 
experiments were designed to compare the effectiveness in promoting efficient choices of social 
emotions, particularly feelings of guilt and shame, vis-à-vis externally-imposed regulatory 
controls. We are mainly interested in the value of external regulatory pressure to promote 
efficiency in environmental and natural resource settings in the developing world. Regulatory 
controls may not produce more efficient choices in communities in which individual emotions 
serve as brakes on purely self-interested behavior.  
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Our notions of guilt and shame come from similar definitions employed by Bowles and 
Gintis (2003), Elster (1989, 1998), Hollander (2001), and Kandel and Lazear (1992). We define 
guilt as an internal penalty, or disutility, that one experiences when her non-cooperative behavior 
is not known by others in a society, whereas shame occurs when anonymity is removed and the 
individual’s behavior is revealed to others.1
 Our work is closely related to other experimental studies that suggest that the desire to 
avoid social disapproval or gain social approval can enhance cooperative behavior. Gächter and 
Fehr (1999) show that avoiding social disapproval and peer pressure can induce cooperation 
when combined with some familiarity among subjects. Masclet et al. (2003) implemented a point 
system that individuals could use to express a degree of disapproval. Use of this system did not 
entail costs for those assigning points or receiving points.2  This simple way of communicating 
disapproval increased contributions to the public good.  Rege and Telle (2004) find that the 
simple identification of subjects and their contributions to a public good, without giving other 
group members the ability to express approval or disapproval, tends to increase contributions in a 
one-shot public good game.3 In contrast, Noussair and Tucker (2007) suggest that the positive 
effects of publicly revealing individuals’ contributions may rapidly deteriorate over time.  
 The key distinguishing feature between the two is 
that shame depends on the public revelation of individual behavior whereas guilt does not. Of 
course, guilt and shame have positive opposites—an individual may feel a sense of pride that 
comes from knowing that she has been cooperative and that feeling may be accentuated when 
her cooperative behavior is known to the rest of her community. These emotions can enhance 
cooperative behavior because they produce either internal sanctions for noncooperative behavior 
or internal rewards for cooperation. Such cooperation-enhancing emotions are often called pro-
social emotions (Bowles and Gintis 2003). 
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The traditional response to correcting externalities generated by the divergence between 
individual and social well-being is to impose regulatory control to induce more efficient 
individual decisions. There is a significant literature on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
regulatory control — typically fixed quotas with some exogenous enforcement apparatus — on 
behavior in common property and public good games. This literature suggests that regulatory 
controls may not be effective at meeting the goal of increasing cooperative behavior. Ostmann 
(1998) finds that external regulation and enforcement financed by experiment participants only 
reduces harvests from a common pool by a small amount relative to a regulation-free 
environment. Beckenkamp and Ostmann (1999) report that high sanctions can cause overuse 
because subjects may perceive the high sanction as unfair. Cardenas et al. (2000) find that a 
quota supported by weak enforcement is effective in initial rounds, but the effectiveness of the 
regulation quickly erodes. Ostrom (2000) discusses how enforcement of externally-imposed 
rules may crowd out endogenous cooperative behavior because it may discourage the formation 
of social norms to solve the dilemma and at the same time may encourage players to cheat the 
system. Velez, Murphy, and Stranlund (forthcoming) demonstrate that regulatory control of a 
common pool resource under which community members can communicate with each other may 
be effective in some locations but counterproductive in others.  
The basis of our experiments is a standard voluntary contribution game with which we 
ask whether realistic regulatory pressure promotes greater contributions to a public good than 
attempts to activate pro-social emotions. Since we are concerned with strategies to promote 
cooperation among environmental and natural resource users in the developing world, we 
conducted our experiments with fishermen and others who are intimately connected to local 
fishing in San Andres and Providencia, two islands off the Caribbean coast of Colombia. We 
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framed the experiments as a situation in which each fisherman decides whether to help to clean 
the beaches and wharves.4  This is a critical issue for the fishermen of these islands because 
keeping the beaches and wharves clean prevents the migration of lobster and other species upon 
which the fishermen depend.  
 We conducted two regulation treatments, each of which required each individual to 
contribute all of one’s tokens to the group. This requirement was backed by an exogenous 
enforcement strategy. After each round of play, individuals’ contributions were audited with a 
probability of 1/5 and a financial penalty was applied in cases of noncompliance. We chose a 
relatively low audit probability because low probabilities of detecting regulatory violations are 
characteristic of many environmental and natural resource policies in the developing world. The 
two regulation treatments differ with respect to the size of the penalty. One treatment used a low 
penalty that, in combination with the audit probability, would not be sufficient to induce 
compliance by risk neutral players. The other penalty was high enough to induce a risk neutral 
agent to fully comply with the requirement to contribute all of her tokens.  
  In an attempt to induce guilt for noncooperative behavior, we conducted another 
treatment in which individual choices were audited with the same 1/5 probability as in our 
regulation treatments. An audited individual received information from the monitor in private 
about her contributions relative to the group’s contributions, particularly the loss the individual 
imposed on the rest of the group because she did not contribute all her tokens. To induce shame, 
we conducted another treatment that was the same except the information about an audited 
individual’s contribution decision was publicly revealed to the entire group.5 This treatment 
differs from others who have examined the role of social disapproval. First, revelation of an 
individual’s choices was random, implying that any effects of shame involved the threat of 
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public disclosure instead of certain disclosure as in Bohnet and Frey (1999), Rege and Telle 
(2004), Masclet et al. 2003, and Noussair and Tucker (2005 and 2007). Second, we did not allow 
group communication in any of our treatments. Thus, unlike Barr (2001) and Masclet et al. 
(2003), we did not give group members the ability to express disapproval. Thus, if shame had 
any effect on play in our public goods game, it is due to the threat of public disclosure of one’s 
behavior rather than certain disclosure and the threat of a public sanction.  
 Our results suggest several insights into the roles of emotions and regulatory pressure in 
promoting more efficient provision of a public good. The most important is that the threat of 
public disclosure of individual contributions produced significantly higher contributions and 
social welfare than regulatory pressure. Even regulatory pressure that would normally be 
predicted to lead to efficient behavior produced lower contributions than the threat of public 
disclosure. Moreover, payoffs in the regulation treatments were much less than when individuals 
faced the threat of public disclosure not only because contributions were lower but also because 
of the penalties that individuals paid for violating the regulations. These results suggest a 
powerful conclusion about the value of regulatory pressure in social dilemmas in the developing 
world—communities in which there is some probability that individual behavior can be observed 
by others may reach more efficient outcomes than can be produced with regulatory pressure.  
 
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Our experiments are based on a standard linear voluntary contributions game with n homogenous 
members of a group with identical monetary payoffs. Each individual, i, within a group received 
an initial endowment of y tokens with which she decided how much to contribute to a group 
project, ig , and how much to keep for herself. The sum of contributions to the group account is 
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multiplied by a constant, a, and then distributed equally among all the group members. The 
payoff function for each participant is then  
[1] 
1
( / ) .ni i iiy g a n gπ == − + ∑  
We chose a such that / 1a n a< < , which leads to a dominant Nash strategy for each individual 
to contribute zero to the group account (gi=0), but the aggregate group payoff is maximized 
when each person contributes all of her tokens to the group project (gi=y).   
When a regulator enforces a requirement that all individuals contribute all tokens to the 
group account, it applies a sanction of ( )is y g−  on individual i when it discovers ig y< . The 
regulator can only observe an individual’s contribution if it conducts an audit, which it does with 
probability p. A risk neutral individual’s expected payoff is then 
[2]  
1
( ) ( / ) .ni i i iiy g p sy g a n gπ == − − − + ∑  
Since 1 /i ig ps a nπ∂ ∂ = − + + , an individual’s Nash contribution is determined by 
[3] 
 if 1 /
0 if 1 / .
y ps a n
g
ps a n
> −
=  < −
 
The subjects in our experiments were placed in groups of n=5, and each group played 15 
rounds under one of six treatments described below.6 The number of rounds was made known to 
the participants at the beginning of each experiment. For all treatments each subject received an 
initial endowment of y=25 tokens and the multiplier a=2. Thus, the marginal per capita return for 
contributing to the public good was a/n=0.4. 
Once a group was gathered together, a monitor read the instructions to the group.7 Verbal 
communication among participants was not permitted in any treatment. The monitor first 
explained that each participant was going to be asked to make an economic decision and would 
earn tokens based on those decisions, and that the tokens would be converted to Colombian 
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pesos at a rate of 25 pesos per token at the end of the session. The monitor also made it clear that 
participation in the experiments was completely voluntary, but that subjects would forfeit their 
payments if they quit before the end of the session. Participants with reading and/or writing 
difficulties received assistance, but they were required to make their contribution decisions on 
their own.   
At the end of each session, earnings were converted to pesos and paid in cash to the 
participants. Individuals’ earnings ranged between 10,290 and 21,395 pesos with an average of 
15,543 pesos (about US $6.70 dollars).8 A show-up payment was not provided, but 
transportation expenses for the subjects were covered. A complimentary snack was offered as 
well. Each experiment lasted about two hours.  
 A total of 36 sessions, evenly divided among the six treatments, were conducted on the 
islands of San Andres and Providencia during September of 2005. A total of 180 individuals 
participated in our experiments, the majority of whom were men (84%) because fishing is a 
male-dominated profession in Colombia. The average participant was a 36 year old male 
fisherman with nine years of formal schooling who has lived in the region for ten or more years.  
Masclet et al. (2003) observe that the standard monetary sanction treatments, such as those in 
Fehr and Gächter (2000), potentially confound a formal system of monetary fines with a vehicle 
to express disapproval of others’ decisions.  In a similar vein, studies with an external regulation 
treatment (e.g. Cardenas et al. 2000) could potentially confound a public reminder about socially 
efficient choices with the financial consequences of noncompliance.  The announcement of a 
regulatory standard provides a signal of socially desirable choices that could serve as a 
coordination device. The audit process requires a comparison, usually conducted in private, of 
the individual’s choice with the standard. If there is a violation of the standard, then a 
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preannounced exogenous financial penalty is imposed.  Hence, it is possible that a simple 
comparison of external penalties with a standard regulation-free linear public goods game 
confounds these three effects. To avoid this potential problem, our experiments were designed in 
layers with each treatment building upon the previous, as shown in Table 1 and described below. 
<<INSERT TABLE 1>> 
 
• Baseline. This was a standard public goods experiment in which each subject decided how to 
allocate her tokens between a private and a group account. In addition, at the end of each 
round, all individual contributions were posted on a board in random order with no 
personally identifying information. Hence, although all the individual choices were known, 
unlike Rege and Teller (2004) and Noussair and Tucker (2007), it was not possible to 
associate these choices with the individual group members.  
 
• Frame: In addition to the procedures for the Baseline treatment, the frame treatment 
included a script read aloud to the entire group before each round that described the 
incentives of the game as follows: 
 
“Before we begin playing for real money, I would like to point something out: As 
you may have noticed, the earnings for the group are the highest when everybody 
contributes 25 tokens to the group project. If you decide to keep tokens for 
yourself, you can increase your individual earnings but you are reducing the 
earnings of the group.” 
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This script is just cheap talk that should have no effect on choices. The Frame treatment is 
really the baseline against which the remaining four treatments should be compared since 
they all include this group reminder about socially efficient choices and free-riding 
incentives. 
 
• Guilt (or Private Reminder). In addition to all the elements of the Frame treatment, at the 
end of each round one of the five subjects was randomly selected to receive the following 
private message about her choice in that round and how it affected the payoffs of the rest of 
the group:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the person contributed all of her tokens, then she received a note saying: “You contributed 
all your 25 tokens to the project, which means you did all you could to make the earnings for 
the group the highest.” To guarantee that no one else in the group knew who received this 
information about how their choices affected the payoffs of the group, the other four group 
members received the same piece of paper but the right column was blank.    
 
The earnings of the group are the highest when everybody contributes all 
of his or her 25 tokens to the group. 
Tokens you contributed to the group project.   
Total tokens contributed to the project.   
Total tokens contributed to the project if you had 
contributed your 25 tokens.    
Losses for the group because you did not contribute all of 
your 25 tokens.   
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• Shame (or Public Revelation). This treatment is essentially the same as the Guilt treatment, 
except that the message about how the randomly selected individual’s contribution affected 
the payoff of the group was read aloud for everyone in the group to hear. Thus, if individual 
contributions under this treatment differ from the Guilt treatment it is because of the threat of 
public revelation of one’s behavior and its consequences for the rest of the group.  
 
• Low Penalty. As in the Guilt and Shame treatments, at the end of each round one individual 
was randomly selected to be audited. This treatment builds upon the Guilt treatment since the 
randomly selected individual received the same private reminder about the consequences of 
her choice. In addition, there was a requirement that each individual fully contribute to the 
group project (gi=y). If the audited person did not contribute all of her tokens to the group 
project, then she was penalized one token (s=1) for every token she did not contribute to the 
group account (i.e., a one token fine for each token in the private account). The audit results 
were kept private. The expected marginal penalty under this treatment was ps = 1/5, while 
the marginal value of violating the requirement to contribute all of one’s tokens is 
1 / 3 / 5.a n− =  From [3], therefore, a risk neutral subject’s dominant Nash strategy under this 
treatment is still to contribute zero tokens to the group account gi=0.  
 
• High Penalty. This treatment is the same as the Low Penalty treatment, except that the 
marginal penalty for violating the requirement to contribute all of one’s tokens was four 
tokens (s=4). Since the expected marginal penalty under this treatment was ps = 4/5, which 
exceeds the marginal value of violating the requirement of 1 / 3 / 5,a n− =  a risk neutral 
subject’s dominant Nash strategy under this treatment is to fully comply with the requirement 
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and contribute all of her tokens to the group account, gi=y. Note that this is the only one of 
the six treatments that a standard theory of risk-neutral, payoff-maximizing behavior would 
predict would be efficient.  
 
III. RESULTS 
Figures 1 presents a time series of average individual contributions to the group project by 
treatment, and Figure 2 shows expected individual earnings.9 Averages for all rounds are shown 
in Table 2. These charts suggest some interesting patterns in the data that we investigate more 
rigorously shortly. For the first five rounds, average contributions to the group project are 
roughly the same for the Shame, Low Penalty and High Penalty treatments, about 75-80% of the 
endowment.  However, in subsequent rounds, contributions in the Shame treatment are 
consistently the highest.  That average contributions to the group project under the Shame 
treatment (20.2) tend to be higher than under the Low and High Penalty treatment (18.2 and 18.5, 
respectively) suggests that the threat of public disclosure may have a greater impact on 
contributions than the threat of a monetary sanction, even with a High Penalty that was 
structured to induce risk-neutral payoff-maximizing individuals to contribute all of their tokens. 
Since average contributions are highest under the Shame treatment, average earnings (45.2) are 
highest as well. Average earnings under the High Penalty (38.3) treatment are lower than any 
other treatment, including the Baseline. This is a bit surprising because this is the only treatment 
in which, theoretically, every individual should contribute all of their tokens to the group account 
and, therefore none should be penalized. Although, more participants were perfectly compliant in 
the High Penalty treatment (176 of 450) than in any other treatment, average earnings are lower 
due to the heavy penalties individuals paid by those who did not fully contribute. There is no 
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statistical difference in the rate of compliance for the Shame treatment (165 of 450, p=0.49), but 
the absence of fines leads to higher earnings.  
<<INSERT TABLE 2>> <<INSERT FIGURE 1>><<INSERT FIGURE 2>> 
 To analyze our data more rigorously, Table 3 presents the results from two random 
effects Tobit models of the form it it i ity x vβ ε= + + in which xit is a vector of fixed effects, 
2~ (0, )i vv N σ  are the random effects, and 
2~ (0, )i N εε σ .  In the first model in Table 3, the 
dependent variable yit, is individual contributions, [0, 25]itg ∈ ; the dependent variable in the 
second model is individual earnings, [0,65]itπ ∈ . For these regressions we divided the 15 rounds 
of each experiment into 3 intervals: the First interval included the first 5 rounds, the Middle 
interval included rounds 6 through 10, and the Last interval included the last five rounds. We 
interacted these time intervals with each of the fixed effect treatment variables. The omitted 
treatment variable is the Baseline. The results in Table 3 do not include the time intervals 
interacted with the Baseline because a separate regression indicated that contributions and 
earnings were unchanged over time in this treatment (this can also be observed in Figures 1 and 
2).10 Eliminating the time interval interaction with Baseline greatly simplifies the interpretation 
of the constant in these regressions: the average contributions and average earnings over all 
rounds under the Baseline treatment. All of the remaining coefficients in Table 3 are interpreted 
as deviations from the Baseline. Let us now turn to the main results of our study.  
<<INSERT TABLE 3>> 
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Result 1 (Frame): Informing subjects that contributing all tokens to the group project 
maximizes aggregate earnings did not affect average contributions or earnings, but did 
alter the distribution of decisions. 
The Frame treatment differs from our Baseline treatment only in that we explicitly told subjects 
in the Frame experiments that their group’s payoff would be maximized if they contributed all of 
their tokens to the group project. The regression results in Table 3 suggest that this message had 
a small positive, but not statistically significant, effect on contributions and earnings (i.e., none 
of the Frame coefficients are significant).  This suggests that simply telling the subjects that the 
efficient outcome is reached when they all contribute all of their tokens does not have an effect 
on average outcomes. However, it would be incorrect to conclude that the Frame has no impact 
on decisions.  Figure 3 presents the distribution of contribution decisions for each treatment.  In 
the Frame treatment, there is a pronounced increase in the frequency of “high” contributions in 
the 20-25 token range compared to the Baseline.  Interestingly, there are also more noncompliant 
subjects in the Frame treatment. It appears that the script essentially shifted contribution 
decisions from the middle to the two extremes while preserving the mean. A Komolgorov-
Smirnov test confirms that the two distributions are statistically different (p=0.00). 
<<INSERT FIGURE 3>> 
 
Result 2 (Guilt): The random private reminder of one’s contribution decision did not affect 
average contributions or earnings.  
The Guilt treatment differs from the Frame treatment in one way: after each round a single 
individual was randomly selected to receive a private message about the negative consequence of 
her contribution on the payoffs of the rest of the group. The results in Table 3 show that 
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individual contributions and earnings under the Guilt treatment were not significantly different 
from the Baseline in the First and Middle time intervals, but were significantly higher in the Last 
time interval. The most relevant comparison though is with the results under the Frame 
treatment. Contributions and earnings under the Guilt treatment were not significantly different 
than the Frame treatment in the First interval (p = 0.88 and p = 0.95 for contributions and 
earnings respectively), in the Middle interval (p = 0.90 and p = 0.82), and in the Last interval (p 
= 0.23 and p = 0.18).11 A Komolgorov-Smirnov test indicates that there is no difference between 
the two distributions of contribution decisions (p=0.34). It therefore appears that adding a private 
reminder to randomly selected individuals has little impact on outcomes relative to just a general 
announcement to the group about efficient choices.  
 
Result 3 (Shame): The random public revelation one’s contribution decision yielded 
significantly higher average contributions and earnings. 
The Shame treatment differs from the Guilt treatment in that the message a randomly selected 
individual received about the affects of her contributions on the rest of the group was read aloud, 
rather than being kept private. Thus, the entire group knew which individual was selected and 
how that individual’s behavior affected earnings. It is clear from the regressions in Table 3 that 
the simple threat that one’s choices and their consequences would be revealed to the rest of the 
group had significantly positive impacts on both contributions and individual earnings relative to 
the Baseline. Again, however, the most relevant comparison is with the Frame treatment. 
Individual contributions to the group project in the Shame treatment are significantly higher than 
under the Frame treatment in all three time intervals (p=0.04, p=0.00, p=0.00 for First, Middle, 
Last respectively). As one would expect, the higher contributions in the Shame treatment also 
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lead to higher individual earnings in all time intervals (p=0.03, p=0.00, p=0.00). Shame 
treatment contributions and earnings are also consistently higher than the Guilt treatment. 
Our results concerning the positive effects of the public revelation of choices and 
consequences differ from recent work by Noussair and Tucker (2007). They find that publicly 
revealing all subjects’ contributions increased contribution in early rounds, but that contribution 
levels quickly fell over time. They also find this effect with their Non-Monetary Punishment 
treatment in Noussair and Tucker (2005). In contrast, average contributions and earnings in our 
Shame experiments were slightly higher in the later rounds (also see Figure 1). Several 
differences between our experiments and Noussair’s and Tucker’s could explain the different 
results. First, Noussair and Tucker revealed every individual’s contribution while we revealed 
the contribution of a single randomly chosen individual. It may be that the threat of being singled 
out for scrutiny is a more powerful and lasting motivator than being scrutinized along with 
everyone else your group. Second, while Noussair and Tucker only revealed individual 
contributions, we also revealed how an individual’s contribution produced a loss for the rest of 
the group if the individual did not contribute all of their tokens.  This decidedly negative spin on 
not contributing tokens to the group project, in combination with the threat of being singled out, 
may have kept contributions from deteriorating over time. Finally, Noussair and Tucker 
conducted neutrally-framed experiments with college students, while our experiments were 
mainly with fishermen and were framed to closely resemble a problem they routinely encounter. 
Moreover, the villagers in these communities typically interact and cooperate with each other on 
a variety of other similar issues. Thus, the positive and sustained impact of the threat of public 
revelation that we identify may be a manifestation of the social pressure and behavioral norms 
that these communities use to sustain cooperation in many areas of their daily lives.  
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Result 4: There is no difference in average contributions between the Low and High 
Penalty treatments.  
Recall that the expected marginal penalty under the Low Penalty treatment (0.20 tokens per unit 
violation) was not high enough to motivate a risk-neutral payoff-maximizing individual to 
comply with the requirement to contribute all of her tokens, but the expected marginal penalty 
under the High Penalty treatment (0.80 tokens) was high enough to induce perfect compliance by 
such an individual. Although the two regulation treatments have markedly different theoretical 
outcomes, there is no statistically significant difference in observed individual contributions in 
any of the three time intervals (p=0.13, p=0.28, p=0.63).   That contributions under the two 
treatments were essentially the same implies that the higher penalty for noncompliance played no 
role in increasing contributions despite the fact that, from the perspective of standard theory, the 
High Penalty regulation should have maximized contributions and earnings.  
 With the same average contribution decisions, but substantially greater fines in the High 
Penalty treatment, earnings are less than with the Low Penalty in all three time intervals (p=0.04, 
p=0.01, p=0.00). In fact, as shown in Figure 2, the High Penalty treatment has the lowest average 
earnings of any treatment, including the Baseline, even though in theory it should yield the 
highest earnings. Earnings in the Low Penalty treatment start out slightly higher than the 
Baseline, but this benefit quickly decays leaving no difference in earnings between these two 
treatments in the later rounds. Likewise, there is no difference in earnings when comparing the 
Low Penalty and Frame treatments. Hence, these results concerning average individual earnings 
indicate that regulatory pressure did not make the groups better off.  
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 Our results about the effects of random monetary sanctions for violations of a 
requirement to contribute all of one’s tokens warrants some skepticism about the value of 
regulatory pressure to improve the lot of small scale resource users in the developing world. One 
might argue that they improve social efficiency because they lead to higher contributions, at least 
with respect to the Baseline treatment, but it is clear that the increase in welfare that this 
produces is in large part transferred from the group to the larger society via the sanctions that 
noncompliant group members pay. Moreover, our final result suggests that regulatory pressure is 
unequivocally worse than the limited social pressure that arises from the Shame treatments.  
 
Result 5 (Shame): The threat of public revelation of one’s choices led to significantly higher 
earnings than regulatory pressure. 
The threat of public revelation ended up being significantly better at enhancing group payoffs 
than any other treatment, including both regulatory treatments. In the First time interval, average 
earnings in the Shame treatment were statistically indistinguishable from those with a Low 
Penalty (p=0.25), but exceed High Penalty earnings (p=0.00).  In the Middle and Last intervals, 
Shame treatment earnings are significantly greater than both Low and High Penalty earnings 
(p=0.00 for all comparisons). Both the lower level of contributions and the fines for 
noncompliance in the two regulation treatments account for the erosion in group welfare. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The primary message of this work is a negative one concerning the performance of government 
interventions in small-scale resource industries in the developing world. Although each of our 
regulation treatments induced greater public good contributions relative to an unregulated 
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baseline, neither of them outperformed the random public revelation of individual choices and 
their consequences for the rest of the group. This is particularly interesting because one of the 
regulation treatments was designed to maximize group payoffs. This regulation was nowhere 
near efficient, and its performance was dominated by the simple threat of public revelation. 
Therefore, in communities where there are mechanisms for triggering social emotions akin to 
shame, these emotions can support greater cooperation than regulatory pressure, even when 
regulations are designed to be efficient.  In these situations a regulator would be better advised to 
leave the management of the natural resources to the community.  Our results also point to an 
interesting question for future work—Does regulatory pressure complement or crowd-out social 
emotions in the management of natural resources?  
 We also claim contributions to the experimental literature on the effects of publicly 
revealing individual choices on levels of cooperation. One of the key elements of our design is 
that public revelation was a random event while, to our knowledge, other researchers reveal the 
choices of all individuals. Thus, the effects of public revelation that we find are due to 
individuals’ perceptions of the threat of their behavior being revealed to the rest of their group, 
rather than the certainty of revelation. In many settings, including in the communities that 
motivate our research, random revelation is a more realistic way to approach this issue than 
revealing every individual’s choices all the time. In our lives we simply are not perfectly 
informed of our neighbors’ behavior as it concerns our well-being; we only observe their choices 
with some probability. This is also true of the communities in the developing world that motivate 
our research.  
 Finally, our choice to conduct framed experiments with the very individuals that we are 
interested in is certainly important. Given our interest in cooperative behavior in managing 
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natural resources in the developing world, it is appropriate that we traveled to communities in the 
developing world and presented a social dilemma to individuals whose livelihoods are tied to the 
resolution of closely related dilemmas.  The advantage of such framed field experiments is that 
subjects bring a context from their daily lives that could influence their behavior in the 
experiments, and that context is an important element of the question that is being addressed. 
The positive effects of randomly revealing individual choices, as well as the poor performance of 
our regulation treatments, may be influenced by the informal norms and sanctions that are 
important in the communities we visited, as well as their view of the government regulations 
they operate under. Disentangling these influences requires further research that combines field 
experiments and detailed knowledge of the lives of the subjects.  
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1  It is important to note that these notions of shame and guilt are not universally accepted 
among social scientists. The definitions we use tend to be accepted by economists, 
anthropologists, and political scientists who consider shame as a more “public” emotion than 
guilt. “Shame is seen as arising from public exposure and disapproval of some shortcoming or 
transgression, whereas guilt is seen as a more  “private” experience arising from self-
generated pangs of conscience” (Tangney and Dearing, 2002:14). According to some 
psychologists, however, this distinction is not clear cut, because it is possible to experienced 
solitary shame.  Lewis (1971:30) makes the following distinction between guilt and shame: 
“The experience of shame is directly about the self, which is the focus of evaluation. In guilt, 
the self is not central object of negative evaluation, but rather the thing done or undone is the 
focus. In guilt, the self is negatively evaluated in connection with something but is not itself 
the focus of experience”. However, in a study by Tangney et al. (1996) that attempted to 
distinguish shame and guilt, they found that subjects felt “scrutinized” by others when they 
felt shame. This is consistent with our distinction in which shame is produced by social 
observation.  
2  In a similar literature, sanctions within groups (as opposed to external sanctions that would be 
imposed for violations of regulatory controls) are costly both for individual punishers and for 
those being punished (e.g. Yamagishi 1986, Ostrom, Walker and Gardner 1992, Fehr and 
Gaechter 2000, Falk et al. 2001, Masclet et al. 2001). Noussair and Tucker (2005) find that the 
availability of monetary and non-monetary sanctions leads to higher contributions and group 
welfare than the availability of either alone.  
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3  Bohnet and Frey (1999) find a similar result in dictator and prisoner’s dilemma games.  
4  We share the concerns of Levitt and List (2007) and others that laboratory experiments with 
university students playing abstract games may not produce outcomes that are valid predictors 
of real world behavior in some contexts. Using the taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004), our 
experiments are framed field experiments. Our experiment closely mirrors the natural 
occurring dilemma that concerns us, and our subject pool was drawn from populations in 
which small scale fishing from a local fishery is the main economic activity. 
5  To be clear, we only claim to have attempted to induce feelings of guilt, shame, or related 
emotions. We do not know if the subjects in our experiments actually experienced these 
emotions. 
6  Assignment to groups was not completely random. Members of the same household were not 
allowed in the same group and we tried to ensure that other relatives were in separate groups.  
7  The experiment instructions are in the appendix. The instructions were first written in English, 
and then translated to Spanish. Another individual then translated the instructions back to 
English to minimize translation errors. 
8  In July of 2005 one US dollar was equivalent to 2,330 Colombian pesos. A day’s wage in the 
fishery industry or in agriculture on the islands of San Andres and Providencia was about 
15,000 pesos 
9  We use expected, rather than actual, earnings since at the time of the contribution decisions, 
individuals still face uncertainty about audits.  
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10  We can compare our Baseline results to the results of other standard public good games with 
similar parameters, group size and marginal benefits of contributions (Ledyard 1995, Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999 and Davis and Holt 1992). Average contributions in other experiments tend to 
start at around 40%-60% of the initial endowment and decline over time to 10-30%. In our 
results, average contributions are in the 50%-60% range over all rounds. Interestingly, the 
“endgame effect” in which contributions fall considerably in the last period that is often 
observed is not present in our Baseline experiments. Since our Baseline treatment is similar to 
many other voluntary contribution experiments, we attribute our different results to the fact 
that we conducted framed field experiments instead of an abstract public goods game with 
university students.  
11  Unless otherwise noted, statistical comparisons of regression coefficients were conducted with 
Wald χ2 tests. 
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Table 1: Experimental Design 
 
Treatment Description 
Baseline  Standard linear public goods game 
Frame Baseline +  Public reminder about benefits of cooperation 
Guilt Baseline + Frame +  1/5 chance of receiving private reminder of the 
social losses resulting from the individual’s 
noncooperative behavior 
Shame Baseline + Frame + Guilt +  1/5 chance of receiving public announcement 
of the social losses resulting from the 
individual’s noncooperative behavior 
Low Penalty Baseline + Frame + Guilt + 1/5 chance of incurring a 1 token per unit 
penalty for noncooperative behavior 
High Penalty Baseline + Frame + Guilt + 1/5 chance of incurring a 4 token per unit 
penalty for noncooperative behavior 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
 
Treatment 
Average 
Contributions 
Average  
Earnings 
Baseline 14.6 39.6 
 (6.3) (6.3) 
   
Frame 16.2 41.2 
 (8.0) (8.0) 
   
Guilt 16.9 41.9 
 (7.6) (7.6) 
   
Shame 20.2 45.2 
 (6.7) (6.7) 
   
Low 18.2 41.8 
 (7.7) (7.0) 
   
High 18.5 38.3 
 (7.9) (7.1) 
    Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 3:  Random Effects Tobit Models of Individual Contributions to Group Project and 
Expected Earnings 
 Contributions  
Expected 
Earnings  
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error Coefficient Std. Error 
 
Constant (Baseline)  14.90 *** 1.32  39.62 *** 0.85 
First × Frame  2.10  1.93  1.67 1.26 
First × Guilt  2.46  1.93  1.59 1.26 
First × Shame  6.32 *** 1.94  4.59 *** 1.26 
First × High Penalty  8.67 *** 1.97  0.34 1.26 
First × Low Penalty  5.57 *** 1.93  3.08 *** 1.26 
Middle × Frame  2.40  1.93  1.57 1.26 
Middle × Guilt  2.64  1.93  1.87 1.26 
Middle × Shame  8.78 *** 1.95  6.20 *** 1.26 
Middle × High Penalty  7.03 *** 1.96  -1.26 1.26 
Middle × Low Penalty  4.83 *** 1.93  1.96 1.26 
Last × Frame  2.42  1.93  1.37 1.26 
Last × Guilt  4.84 *** 1.94  3.26 *** 1.26 
Last × Shame  8.87 *** 1.95  5.99 *** 1.26 
Last × High Penalty  5.59 *** 1.96  -2.93 *** 1.26 
Last × Low Penalty  4.60 ** 1.93  1.56 1.26 
 
Asterisks reflect p-values:  * p ≤   0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01. The constant is interpreted 
as average contributions or earnings under the Baseline treatment. The individual random 
effects are not reported and are available upon request. 
 31 
Figure 1: Average Individual Contributions to Group Project by Treatment 
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Figure 2: Average Individual Expected Earnings by Treatment 
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Figure 3: Distribution of individual group contribution decisions by treatment 
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